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Abstract 
 
Spinoza‟s notion of „God‟ is examined in the article through prisms of: (i) criticism of 
religious consciousness in „Theological-Political Treatise‟, (ii) theory of affects 
developed in „Ethics‟, and (iii) Spinoza‟s comments on language. Philosophy and 
religion are completely different in their foundations and goals. Spinoza argued 
therefore, there can be nothing in common between the religious and philosophical 
concepts of God except the word „God‟. Behind this religious name, Spinoza has a 
logical-mathematical concept of infinity, which serves as the „most perfect method‟ of 
knowing the nature of things. The article examines the purpose for which Spinoza used 
the word „God‟ along with the philosophical terms „substance‟ and „Nature,‟ and how his 
philosophical God differs from the gods of religions. The authors show that Spinoza‟s 
language strategy gave rise to discrepancies and made it difficult to understand the text, 
but it helped transform Spinozism into the mainstream of Modernity.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Spinoza‟s God is one of the most controversial characters of the 
„philosophical theatre‟. Contemporaries, with the exception of a handful of 
apostles, saw in Spinoza a „deserter of religion‟, „atheistic Euclid‟, and even 
„Prince atheists‟ (Atheorum Princeps). A century later, Spinoza would turn into 
an Architheist (Herder), a Christianissimus and „the God-intoxicated man‟ 
(Novalis). No less old are the suspicions that Spinoza secretly dragged into the 
philosophy the mystical Kabbalah‟s Ain Soph, or the Old Testament‟s Jehovah - 
disguising him in geometric clothes and taking away his personality 
(Schopenhauer). These differences have not subsided to this day. It is hardly 
possible to cope with them in the way of the study of Jewish education, various 
„influences‟ and „exchanges‟, as well as divinations about Spinoza‟s mentality. 
We propose to put all this stuff aside and look for a clue in his own texts. The 
three keys will be for us the teaching of Spinoza about religion and its 
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relationship with Philosophy, his reasoning about language, and, finally, the 
theory of affects. 
 
2. Separation of Philosophy from religion 
 
The first fact on which we safely can and must rely: Spinoza in no way 
considered his philosophy to be religious. He unequivocally demanded “to 
separate religion from philosophical speculation (religio a speculationibus 
philosophicis separare)” [1]. This is literally a cross-cutting idea of his 
Theological-Political Treatise. A special chapter of this book is devoted to 
clarifying how best to “separate faith from Philosophy, which was the main goal 
of all work” [1, p. 264]. Spinoza comes here to the following conclusion. 
“There are no dealings, or no relationship, between faith, or Theology, 
and Philosophy. ... These two faculties aim at, and are based on, completely 
different things (sane toto coelo). For the goal of Philosophy is nothing but truth. 
But the goal of Faith, as we‟ve shown abundantly, is nothing but obedience and 
piety. Furthermore, the foundations of Philosophy are common notions, and that 
must be sought only from nature. But [the foundations] of Faith are histories and 
language, and [that] must be sought only from Scripture and revelation, as we 
showed in Ch. 7.” [1, p. 271] 
What does this mean in respect to the word „God‟? Obviously, the fact 
that the philosophical God has nothing to do with the gods of religious traditions 
and creeds. In general, all the content of Ethics should be understood in a purely 
philosophical, i.e. scientific, and not religious and theological sense. Philosophy 
explores the „common notion‟ of God, which is given in the intellect; while the 
idea of God, drawn by the prophets and theologians, belongs to the field of 
inadequate „knowledge of the first kind‟ – opinion or imagination. The word 
„God‟ is one and the ideas are as different as chalk and cheese, toto coelo. 
The same words of the human language can express both „confused‟ ideas 
of the imagination and „clear and distinct‟ ideas of the intellect. But, by its 
nature, language is much better suited to expressing sensual images and 
abstractions of imagination than common notions of the intellect. Language is 
the creation of a „crowd‟ (vulgus), that is why it is so difficult for the intellect to 
convey its ideas through words. 
“Since words are part of the imagination, ... it is not to be doubted that 
words, as much as the imagination, can be the cause of many and great errors, 
unless we are very wary of them. Moreover, they are established according to 
the pleasure and power of understanding of ordinary people, so that they are 
only signs of things as they are in the imagination, but not as they are in the 
intellect.” [1, vol. 1, p. 38] 
When reading these lines from the Treatise on the Emendation of the 
Intellect, complaints of Francis Bacon on the “idols of the market-place” come 
to mind [2]. This is on account of these idols that Spinoza was considered a 
religious thinker. The word „God‟ literally hypnotized readers, easily breaking 
through the wall, with which Spinoza tried to protect Philosophy from religion. 
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In addition, Spinoza‟s texts (as well as Descartes‟ and Leibniz‟s) are full of 
scholastic terms and expressions. Thus the author of Ethics turned into a 
theologian, „the last of the medievals‟ [3, p. 273; 4]. 
The magic of the word „God‟ confused even materialistic philosophers, 
militant critics of religion in general and Judeo-Christian religious traditions in 
particular. “The philosophy of Spinoza was a religion” – declared Feuerbach [5]. 
Marxist L.I. Akselrod (orthodox) saw in the Spinoza system the development of 
the “cult of Jehovah”, which “firmly took possession of the touching and poetic 
soul of the great philosopher”. His teachings are imbued with a “deeply rooted 
religious feeling”. Only in place of Jehovah Spinoza had put the deified “world 
order”, or Nature, Axelrod concluded [6, p. 552]. 
If Spinoza himself considered it absolutely unacceptable to mix 
Philosophy with religion, and even more so with Theology, then the readers of 
his Ethics constantly practiced such mixing. Only in the past half century has 
this bad tradition visibly weakened. Today, it is considered good practice to 
praise Spinoza as the „first secular Jew‟, the pioneer and inspirer of the European 
„Radical Enlightenment‟. This is, of course, a much more adequate view. 
Spinoza‟s desire to protect Philosophy and Science in general, from 
religious interventions does not mean, however, that he had a negative attitude 
towards religion. This is not true. Religion brings great benefits to people. On 
the one hand, it teaches them to obey, subordinate their private interest to the 
common, and on the other, it comforts them in their misfortunes and strengthens 
them with hope. 
Theology is quite different. Spinoza is extremely negative towards this 
hybrid of Philosophy with religion, the intellect – with the imagination, the 
concepts of „pure mind‟ (ex pura mente) – with abstractions of „vague 
experience‟. The word „theology‟ in his texts has a pejorative colouring, except 
when it comes to the „word of God‟ as such, or the „revelation‟. This kind of 
„elemental‟ theology preaches obedience and teaches righteous living without 
pretending to know the nature of things and without resorting to logical 
argumentation („mathematical demonstrations‟, as Spinoza puts it). 
Only in one place Ethics Spinoza, in a respectful tone, mentions the 
theologians: “some of the Hebrews seem to have seen, as if through a cloud”, the 
truth about the relationship of ideas and bodies, the intellect of God and created 
things [1, vol. 1, p. 451]. Vague speculation is the maximum that Theology is 
capable of. As for the rest, “the theologians have mainly been anxious to twist 
their own inventions and fancies out of the Sacred Texts, to fortify them with 
divine authority” [1, p. 170]. “Maimonides and others ... extort from Scripture 
Aristotelian rubbish and their own inventions. Nothing seems to me more 
ridiculous.” [1, p. 82] 
Spinoza undoubtedly ranked Maimonides as „some of the Hebrews‟ who 
were able to see the truth through the theological cloud. His opus magnum, The 
Guide for the Perplexed, was in Spinoza‟s library and was familiar to him from 
school. In chapter 68 of part I, the interpretation of the identity in God of the 
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intellect and the things comprehended by His intellect was given (with reference 
to the „divine philosophers‟). 
At the same time, Spinoza condemned, in the most categorical manner, 
the attempts of Maimonides and other scholastics to reconcile reason and faith, 
Philosophy and religion. In Spinoza‟s eyes, this occupation is detrimental to both 
Philosophy and religion itself. “If Maimonides is taken, as he has been, as a 
paradigm of religious rationalism in Judaism, then Spinoza‟s critique of 
Maimonides is a critique not only of Maimonidean biblical hermeneutics but of 
the attempt to forge some kind of synthesis of biblical faith and Philosophy.” [7, 
p. 555] 
Any kind of philosophizing about the foundations of religion “gave rise to 
many disputes and schisms, which have tormented the church incessantly from 
the time of the Apostles to the present day, and will surely continue to torment it 
forever, until at last someday religion is separated from philosophic speculations 
and reduced to those very few and very simple doctrines Christ taught his 
followers” [1, vol. 2, p. 247]. 
Spinoza does not consider Christ to be a religious innovator. He did not 
teach people anything new, but only tried to bring them back to the fountainhead 
of any faith. What is this fountainhead? It is just love for the neighbour: “The 
whole law consists only in this: loving one‟s neighbour. ... So this command 
itself is the unique standard of the whole universal faith.” [1, p. 265] The entire 
connection of people, the very human society, is held up by the affect of love. 
 
3. Love, obedience and the idea of God 
 
By its nature, the affect of love is twofold. Religious/imaginative love for 
the neighbour is based on obedience to the word of God, while 
philosophical/intellectual love is based on the knowledge of the nature of things 
(= of God, in Spinoza‟s sense). 
Words, as we recall, are „part of the imagination‟, and religious faith, with 
its concepts of God, is always perceived by word of mouth, „from hearsay‟ (ex 
auditu). Consequently, faith belongs to the second kind of imaginative 
knowledge. (The first kind of imagination, according to Spinoza, is random 
sensory experience, the second kind is knowledge ex auditu). 
To human mind, the idea of God is innate as a „common notion‟. Any 
person enjoys it by nature, due to the „natural light‟ of the mind. “The infinite 
being of God and his eternity are known to all (omnibus esse notam).” [1, vol. 1, 
p. 482] Another thing is that this innate idea of God is obscured by superstitions 
and “empty religion (vana religio)”, imposing “nothing but apparitions, the 
delusions of a sad and fearful mind” [1, p. 67]. 
In itself, the idea of God is absolutely nothing mystical, open only to 
selected people or nations. Anyone who has an intellect possesses the idea of 
God. 
 
 
The ‘true religion’ and the philosophical god of Spinoza 
 
  
121 
 
Quite a few commentators on Spinoza hold the view that the infinite 
intellect, as such, is nothing more than the idea of God. For example: “The 
„infinite intellect‟ (i.e. the infinita idea Dei) ...” [8, p. 240]. “Infinite 
understanding is not part of the divine nature: it is merely the idea Dei.” [9, 
p. 183]. “It is clear that an idea of God or an infinite intellect constitute the 
infinite immediate mode under the attribute of cogitation.” [10, p. 196] “... The 
universe‟s cognition (what Spinoza calls „the infinite intellect‟ or „the idea of 
God‟).” [11, p. 26] 
We believe this is not quite the case. The relationship here is typically 
Spinozian: the intellect and the idea of God are two different modes of being of 
the same thing. Two different ways of acting and expressing the substance itself 
as a thinking thing. Both of these infinite and eternal modes „follow from the 
absolute nature‟ of the attribute of thought, but follow in different ways. The 
intellect is produced by God immediately, while all other modes of thought 
(Spinoza makes no exception for the idea of God) are produced through the 
medium of intellect. The intellect actually contains all the ideas – both the idea 
of God itself and the ideas of any of his modifications, finite and infinite. 
Being a part of the infinite intellect, the idea of God is equal to the 
intellect by „extension‟: all other ideas of the mind follow from it – “infinitely 
many things in infinitely many modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an 
infinite intellect)” [1, vol. 1, p. 424]. In the mathematical set theory, the presence 
within a whole of a part, equinumerous to the whole, is considered the 
distinguishing feature of an actually infinite [12]. 
By virtue of the famous proposition on the identity of order and 
connection of ideas and things [1, vol. 1, p. 451], the relation of the idea of God 
to other ideas is the same as the relation of substance to its modes. All things 
exist in God, but the distinction (and even the opposition) between God and 
things, Natura naturans and Natura naturata, does not disappear. The same 
applies to the distinction between the idea of God and the ideas of things-modes 
within the infinite intellect. 
Thus, between the intellect and the idea of God it is impossible to put an 
equality sign or „i.e.‟ even though both of these modes express one thing under 
the same attribute. The infinite intellect and the infinite idea of God – the whole 
and its peculiar part – are equipotent, equinumerous, but not identical. They are 
different formaliter, in the language of medieval philosophy and Spinoza. 
Another subtle point: since the idea of God is given a priori and in no way 
depends on philosophical reflection, then what does the first part of Ethics 
entitled „On God‟ offer us? Obviously, we find here not a simple idea of God, 
but a reflexive one, or the „idea of idea‟ of God. Spinoza constructs his 
philosophical God through the reflection of simple common notion of God. 
According to Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, the “idea of idea” is 
nothing but a method of acquiring knowledge, and the reflective idea of God is 
the “most perfect Method” (Methodus pertfectissima), i.e. universal and most 
powerful of all possible [1, vol. 1, p. 19]. In the first part of Ethics, such a 
method is forged, and in the subsequent parts it is applied. 
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Further. Any idea causes a certain affect in the mind. Amor Dei, love of 
God... For what purpose does Spinoza add the adjective „intellectual‟? He 
clearly wants to distinguish this higher kind of love, generated by adequate 
ideas, from the feeling of love caused by religious faith. In philosophers and in 
the crowd, both the concept of God and the love of God are completely different. 
It would not hurt those who naïvely consider Spinoza to be a religious thinker on 
the grounds that he sang amor Dei intellectualis to keep this in mind. 
The purpose of „true Religion‟ (Religio vera) is not to cognize God, but to 
maintain everyday morality and social order. While Philosophy is seeking truth 
and the meaning of life (ethics). If these two tasks are not mixed, one is not a 
hindrance to the other. “I can‟t wonder enough”, Spinoza writes, at the people 
“who have then introduced into religion so many matters of philosophic 
speculation that the Church seems to be an Academy, and Religion, science, or 
rather, a logomachy (altercatio)” [1, vol. 2, p. 257–258]. 
The founders of religions dealt primarily with an ignorant multitude and 
adapted their creeds to the mental state of the crowd and its life demands. Their 
speeches and writings appealed to the imagination and passions, and not to the 
intellect. They did not confirm the dogmas of faith with the arguments of reason, 
but „only by experience – that is, by miracles and historical narratives‟. 
“From all this it follows that the doctrine of Scripture does not contain 
lofty speculations, or philosophical matters, but only the simplest things, which 
anyone, even the very slowest (tardissimus), can perceive.” [1, p. 257]  
What are these things? – The Book of books teaches honesty, modesty, 
compassion, etc. All this together is called „love of your neighbour‟ and forms 
the foundation of „true Religion‟. The problem is how to get people to obey this 
„word of God‟? Scientific argumentation is no good here, it would instantly 
alienate a lot of listeners. Few aspire to virtue, being guided by pure reason. The 
crowd requires for this an imaginary Lord God – the all-seeing heavenly judge, 
merciful and terrible. This is how Scripture draws it, which does “a great 
comfort to those whose powers of reason are not strong, and brings no slight 
advantage to the Republic” [1, p. 280]. 
The target audience of the Scriptures is not a handful of philosophers, but 
the common people who need to be taught obedience (obedientia). This concept 
is axial in Spinoza‟s religious discourse. Spinoza denies religion and Theology 
the right to enter the “kingdom of truth and wisdom” (regnum veritatis, et 
sapientiae); their domain is the “kingdom of piety and obedience” (regnum 
pietatis, et obedientiae) [1, p. 277]. Spinoza has no illusions about enlightening 
masses. The crowd has always lived and lives by passions; it is possible to instil 
in it humanity, „love of neighbour‟, only through the injection of powerful 
passions – fear and hope, above all. So did the creators of religions. 
The passions (passive affects) of the mind arise from inadequate ideas of 
imagination and inseparably accompany them. Miracles and unusual things 
affect the imagination much better than any „mathematical demonstration. ”The 
creators of Scripture knew this very well and „spoke according to the power of 
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understanding of the common people (vulgus), whom Scripture is concerned to 
make obedient, not learned.” [1, p. 262] 
If religious love rests in obedience to the word of God, then intellectual 
love for God “proceeds from true knowledge as necessarily as light does from 
the sun. So under the guidance of reason we can love God, but not obey him” [1, 
p. 293]. One can only obey an external force or word; obedience is the opposite 
of freedom. If anyone cognizes God as his own nature, „substance‟, then love for 
God coincides with love for the self and for humanity altogether – with love for 
all „thinking things‟ with which we form „as it were, one body – namely, the 
body of a society (unum quasi corpus, nempe societatis) [1, p. 114]. 
As Étienne Balibar has aptly put it, “the fundamental dogma of true 
Religion is, in effect, that love of God and love of one‟s neighbour are really one 
and the same” [13]. 
Spinoza insists that love for God (and therefore for Man) manifests itself 
only in deeds and actions, and not in words and symbols. “We must judge the 
piety of each person‟s faith from his works alone (ex solis operibus).” [1, p. 73] 
He repeats this idea again and again, using as an argument in favour of religious 
toleration, on the one hand, and to defend the „freedom of philosophizing‟ on the 
other. 
True Religion consists of desires and actions that follow from the idea of 
God common to all people. “Again, whatever we desire and do of which we are 
the cause insofar as we have the idea of God, or insofar as we know God, I relate 
to Religion.” [1, vol. 1, p. 565] Desire (cupiditas), or a conscious appetite 
(appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia), is, according to Spinoza, the primary affect 
of the mind, from which all other affects are derived. 
Words and symbols, dogmas and rituals, and even faith stemming from 
external experience, all refer to „empty religion‟. In this regard, Spinoza cites the 
apostle James with approval: “faith by itself, without works, is dead”, adding: 
“From these things it follows next that we can judge no one faithful or unfaithful 
except from their works”. What works exactly? Those dictated by obedience, 
answers Spinoza: “For where there is obedience, there faith is also”. It is 
completely unimportant whether the dogmas of faith are true or whether they 
“do not have even a shadow of the truth” (nec umbram veritatis habent); the 
main thing is that these dogmas “move the heart to obedience” [1, p. 265-267]. 
Thus, true Religion is indifferent to truth. It only cares about human 
affairs; its goal is to make people obey. This universal religion gets the right to 
be called „true‟ due to the fact that it is partially based on the true idea of God. 
This idea causes in minds the affects of desire, contributing to the consolidation 
of their individual and collective existence. 
If the idea of God is the only („adequate‟, in terms of Spinoza) cause of 
certain desires and actions, the person acts freely, „according to the guidance of 
reason‟. And if the idea of God is „partial, or inadequate‟, cause of desires and 
actions (i.e. the person obeys some external power or word, along with the idea 
of God), the actions become forced and constrained (coactae). 
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For example, helping one‟s neighbour can be forced if it is out of a sense 
of compassion, or free if it results from an understanding of the benefits of 
mutual aid. Compassion is a passive affect of imitation of others‟ displeasure 
and the reverse side of envy; the rational help to people is based on the active 
affect of generosity. People should help each other “not from unmanly 
compassion, partiality, or superstition, but from the guidance of reason” [1, vol. 
1, p. 490]. To a free, rational person compassion brings only harm; to the crowd, 
this affect is useful, for it is able to temper the much worse passions of the mind. 
The Christian cult of compassion is good for the crowd, but bad for the 
philosopher. The same applies to any other religious tenets demanding 
obedience. Subjecting to religious imperatives, one acts not freely, but forcedly. 
 
4. Language strategy 
 
Why did Spinoza decide to use the word „God‟, if he really wanted to 
separate Philosophy from Theology? Why not be content with two philosophical 
equivalents – „Nature‟ (more precisely, Natura naturans) and „substance‟? This 
would help protect his philosophy from diffusion with religious doctrines, and 
the label of the „pantheist‟ would disappear by itself. 
To take the word „God‟, to squeeze religious content from it to dryness, 
and after to sing „love for God‟... Did Spinoza realize that, for the most part, 
readers would misunderstand him, no matter how carefully reservation about the 
philosophical meaning of the word „God‟ was made? Surely he was aware, 
because life had repeatedly confronted him with a similar public. In the Preface 
to the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza addressed his work to the 
„Philosophical reader‟ (Philosophus lector), adding: “As for those who are not 
philosophers, I am not eager to commend this treatise to them. There‟s nothing 
in it which I might hope could please them in any way. ... I don‟t ask the 
common people to read these things, nor anyone else who is struggling with the 
same affects as the common people. Indeed, I would prefer them to neglect this 
book entirely, rather than make trouble by interpreting it perversely, as they 
usually do with everything.” [1, p. 75] 
Spinoza did not allow his friends to translate the Theological-Political 
Treatise from learned Latin into Dutch – the language of the crowd, which a 
couple of years later would tear apart the de Witt brothers and begin to devour 
their remains. 
Then for what purpose did the philosopher need the word „God‟? The 
answer must be sought in Spinoza‟s psychological theory. The first clue we find 
at the beginning of Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Arguing about 
how a philosopher should live surrounded by ordinary people, guided not so 
much by reason as by blind affects, Spinoza formulates three „rules of living‟. 
The very first rule is “to speak according to the power of understanding of 
ordinary people (ad captum vulgi loqui)” and “to yield as much to their 
understanding as we can.‟ Why? From this, the philosopher can receive „a 
considerable advantage”, Spinoza responds. It is helpful to be friends and 
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dangerous – hostile with the crowd. When people hear pleasant, especially – 
sacred to many, words, one can hope that “they will give a favourable hearing to 
the truth” [1, vol. 1, p. 12]. 
Could the religious word „God‟ be such a concession to the understanding 
of the crowd? At first, Spinoza called motion and intellect „sons of God‟, natural 
necessity „divine predestination‟, etc. He must have decided later that he had 
gone too far with language concessions to the crowd, since in Ethics we do not 
find the theological vocabulary of such a register. 
As noted in the Theological-Political Treatise, the prophet Moses acted 
quite correctly, „speaking according to the Hebrews‟ power of understanding‟, 
and the apostle Paul, „who was a Greek with the Greeks and a Jew with the 
Jews‟. Likewise, the philosopher should express his thoughts in the language of 
his target audience. This does not guarantee that they will understand you, but at 
least they will hear you. If a philosopher is surrounded entirely by religious 
people (including in the „Republic of Letters‟), the word „God‟ is the best way to 
incline their ear to the perception of philosophical truths. Of course, the meaning 
of these truths will inevitably suffer from the confusion of the language of 
science with the „word of God‟, but this price has to be paid. There was simply 
no reasonable alternative at the time of Spinoza. 
A similar language strategy was already developed by Maimonides. In the 
speeches of the prophets, he divided two layers: one intended for the ignorant 
multitude, the other, the esoteric layer – for men of knowledge, or „the perfect 
man‟. 
Maimonides recommended the same policy to philosophers. Moshe 
Halbertal, in the chapter „Double Language and the Divided Public‟ in Guide of 
the Perplexed, comments on this place at Maimonides as follows. “Esotericism 
is intended, first and foremost, to protect the philosopher and philosophy from 
the mockery of the multitudes that cannot fathom it. More important, it protects 
the philosopher from the iron fist of the religious or political authorities, who see 
the philosopher as a dangerous subversive, seeking to undermine the political 
order or religious doctrine. ... Esotericism is thus a precondition for the existence 
of philosophy as an independent and unrestricted domain. The philosopher 
protects his freedom of thought through concealment, and in order to transmit 
his views to those who are worthy of receiving them, he develops sophisticated 
instruments of writing and speaking in double language.” [14] 
Certainly, language esotericism went with Rambam much further than 
with Spinoza. According to Maimonides, the two-layer structure of the language 
is not only politically expedient in the relationship of the philosopher and the 
crowd, but also corresponds to the symbolic nature of philosophical knowledge 
(„essential esotericism‟, according to Halbertal). Spinoza, as we have seen, 
considered ridiculous the attempts to „extort from Scripture‟ Aristotelian or any 
other kind of philosophy. He contrasted the method of symbolic interpretation of 
the text with the historical-critical method, that “admitted no other principles or 
data for interpreting Scripture and discussing it than those drawn from Scripture 
itself and its history” [1, p. 171]. 
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Spinoza observed his first rule of living not only in communication with 
„ignorant multitude‟ and religiously-minded „learned men‟. His language is not 
limited to only two layers. He spoke different languages to scholars. 
Thus, in Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy Spinoza uses exclusively 
Cartesian terminology: he writes about „substances‟ in the plural, about the „will 
of God‟, etc. In the Preface, Spinoza‟s friend Lodewijk Meyer explains that 
“what is found in some places – viz. that this or that surpasses the human 
understanding – must be taken in the same sense, i.e., as said only on behalf of 
Descartes” [1, vol. 1, p. 230]. Similarly, in correspondence with those who are 
not familiar with his own metaphysics, Spinoza speaks in Cartesian koiné, 
familiar and understandable to his educated contemporaries. 
In Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza never called God „substance‟. 
And in Ethics the term „substance‟ appears only in the first two – metaphysical – 
parts of the book; in talking about the affects „God‟ is much more appropriate. 
Language is not only a form of expression of thoughts, but also a means of 
influencing people. The word „God‟ causes in the crowd passive affects, serving 
a religious reflex of obedience. 
Of course, Spinoza could express his thought with the help of one – purely 
philosophical – term „substance‟. If throughout the whole text of Ethics „God‟ is 
replaced by „substance‟, the philosophical meaning of the book will not change 
one iota; only the affective colouring of the text will change. The reverse 
replacement cannot be made just like that, for the term „substance‟ is already 
included in the initial definition of God. Through the concept of substance, the 
philosophical (read: non-religious!) meaning of the word „God‟ is defined. And 
the expression „I understand‟ (intelligo) here, as it were, underlines that we are 
faced with the God of intellect, and not the imaginary gods of religions. 
The study of affects gives us a second clue when answering the question 
why Spinoza preferred to write about „intellectual love of God‟ rather than of 
Nature or substance. For him, these three terms are synonyms; all three cause the 
same affect, which induces the mind to cognition, to “perfecting the intellect”, 
which is our “supreme good” [1, p. 128]. 
For Spinoza‟s contemporaries, the situation was different. It would be 
absurd and ridiculous to tell them about the „love of substance‟. But the word 
„God‟ gave them a powerful affect, „passion‟, which the philosopher used as an 
emotional enhancer of the „voice of truth‟. The arguments of the mind alone will 
not convince the crowd, it lives mainly by passions. An affect can be restrained 
or taken away only by another, stronger affect [1, vol. 1, p. 550]. Then could the 
author of Ethics neglect such a powerful means of influencing the reader‟s 
feelings as the word „God‟? If the word „substance‟ is addressed to the 
theoretical reason and the intellect in general, then the word „God‟ is clearly 
intended to awaken a favourable affect in the reader‟s mind. At the same time, as 
a person alien to all hypocrisy, Spinoza already in the first lines stipulates a 
purely philosophical meaning, which he puts into this word: “a being absolutely 
infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes” [1, vol. 1, p. 409].  
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More specifically, the philosophical God is defined as a thinking and 
extended thing [1, vol. 1, p. 448-449]. In essence, this God is nothing but the 
eternal causal connection of things, ordo et connexio rerum/causarum, 
expressing itself in corporeal and ideal forms, via the attributes of extension and 
thought (and other infinite attributes unknown to us). Infinite extension is the 
order and connection of bodies, the way they interact. The laws of physical 
sciences give us a specific description of the attribute of extension. And infinite 
thought is the order and connection of ideas, or the way in which one idea is 
logically connected with another. As we see, there is absolutely nothing religious 
in the Spinoza definitions of God. 
„God‟ is far from being the only word whose meaning Spinoza altered in 
the way his theory required. In Ethics we find open recognition of this fact: “I 
know that in their common usage these words mean something else. But my 
purpose is to explain the nature of things, not the meaning of words. I intend to 
indicate these things by words whose usual meaning is not entirely opposed to 
the meaning with which I wish to use them. One warning of this should suffice.” 
[1, vol. 1, p. 535–536] Spinoza is quite satisfied if the meaning he invented does 
not go completely at odds (non omnino abhorret) with the old, commonly used 
meaning of the word! The philosopher has the right to modify semantics of the 
natural language virtually in any way. It is enough to notify openly about this 
once. Such a language strategy was bound, of course, to give rise to deep 
discrepancies and controversies in the minds of readers. It is this strategy that 
seems to us to be the culprit of most of the difficulties that have prevented from 
understanding Spinoza for centuries. At the same time, from a pragmatic point 
of view, Spinoza‟s language strategy proved to be extremely successful. Thanks 
to it, Spinozism, which at first existed as an „underground‟ trend of radical 
enlighteners, by the beginning of the 19
th
 century had turned into the intellectual 
main-stream of Modernity. Thanks to the openness of Spinoza‟s language to the 
most varied (scientific, religious, moral, or poetically artistic) interpretations, his 
philosophy served as the source of many trends in modern culture.  
If in the „kingdom of truth‟ (i.e., in the realm of pure intellect) not the 
slightest confusion of philosophy with theology is permissible, then in the field 
of language (in the territory of imagination) Spinoza actively and consciously 
practiced this mixture. Many of the propositions of his philosophy he 
expounded, so to speak, in a „parallel translation‟ into a theological language. 
Besides, Spinoza inherited his own philosophical vocabulary from the 
scholastics who had carried out a deep „theologization‟ of its semantic core. In 
metaphysics it was difficult to avoid theological connotations, even if Spinoza 
would have wished for it. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Spinoza‟s language strategy was a double-edged sword. It made an 
adequate understanding of the text extremely difficult, but it contributed a lot to 
the popularity of his philosophical doctrine. Eventually, Spinoza‟s calculation 
 Maidansky & Boichuk/European Journal of Science and Theology 15 (2019), 6, 117-128 
 
  
128 
 
was justified: if you express your thoughts in the language of the crowd, people 
“will give a favourable hearing to the truth (ad veritatem audiendam)” [1, vol. 1, 
p. 12]. But to hear truth does not mean to understand it. Between language and 
understanding, between imagination and intellect in general there is an abyss. 
“For we know that those activities by which imaginations are produced happen 
according to other laws, wholly different from the laws of the intellect...” [1, vol. 
1, p. 37]. Spinoza freely changes the common meanings of words; a new wine is 
poured into old wineskins. This is also the case with the word „God‟: behind this 
religious name, Spinoza has a logical-mathematical concept of infinity, called to 
become the „most perfect method‟ of knowing the nature of things. 
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